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Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal
Rules and Common Law
Stephen B. Burbank*
To the average lawyer it is Sanskrit; to the experienced federal practitioner it is monopoly; to the author of text books on federal practice it
is a golden harvest. 1
This description of federal practice and procedure under the Conformity Act of 18722 was an article of faith with those who labored for
years to persuade Congress to replace that statute with an act empowering the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure for actions at
law.3 The accuracy of the description was disputed by some members of
the bar, of the judiciary, and of Congress during the entire period of that
long campaign. 4 There would be little point in trying to determine who
had the better of the debate, for even those who are interested in the
history of American procedure and in the rhetoric of procedural reform
are likely to be more interested in areas within the contemporary landscape of federal practice and procedure where yesterday's rhetoric is today's reality. I propose to examine one such area, federal limitations law,
where there is a distressing aptness for our situation in this rhetorical
gem of another age. I will also argue that federal limitations law is not
unique-that the description is more broadly applicable-and suggest a
strategy for reform. But the occasion would not permit careful broadscale exploration, and perhaps the major lesson that I derive from this
work is that the quest for broad-scale solutions is at times misdirected.
Since the beginning of the Republic, the federal courts have struggled with the problem of limitations periods for federal statutes that do
not specify the time within which a suit must be brought. 5 Unable to fill
the gaps with judge-made rules, 6 but unwilling to indulge the notion that
© 1988 Stephen B. Burbank
*
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. I appreciate the comments of those at the Symposium and of participants at the Legal Studies Seminar, University of Pennsylvania Law School, on
various incarnations of this paper. As usual, I owe a special debt of gratitude to Frank Goodman,
Seth Kreimer, Linda Silberman and Steve Subrin for wise suggestions and warm support.
1 Report of the Committee on UniformrJudicialProcedure, 46 A.B.A. REP. 461, 466 (1921).
2 Act ofJune 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
3 See Burbank, The Rules EnablingAct of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1039-42 (1982).
4 See id. at 1041 nn.107-108, 1063-64, 1083-84 n.296.
5 See McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830). See generally Special Project, Time Bars in
Specialized Federal Common Law: FederalRights of Action and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L.
REv. 1011 (1980).
6 See Burbank, InterjwisdictionalPreclusion, FullFaith and Credit and FederalCommon Law: A General,
Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 733, 769-70 (1986); Currie, On Blazing Trails: Judge Friendly and Federal
Jurisdiction, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 5, 6, 8 (1984); Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95
HtAv. L. REv. 1717, 1721 (1982). "The length of a limitations period is arbitrary-you can't reason
your way to it-and courts are supposed not to be arbitrary; when they are, they get criticized for it."
Hemmings v. Barian, 822 F.2d 688, 689 (7th Cir. 1987).
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a federal statutory claim is timeless, 7 the federal courts found in the
Rules of Decision Act's reference to the "laws of the several states" the
path of least resistance.8 But it was hardly a clear path, as cases involving
claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts demonstrated. Whatever the role envisioned for the Rules of Decision Act at
the time it was passed, 9 how can a state statute of limitations plausibly be
thought to "apply" in a case that the courts of the state are powerless to
hear?

0

Although Congress has in some instances rescued the federal courts
from this embarrassment, as in the Clayton Act, 1 ' the proliferation of
federal statutory law and of implied rights of action in this century have
combined to keep litigants and courts busy guessing, in a pale imitation
of comparative law, what the most closely analogous state law is. I doubt
use
that anybody would contend that such activity represents an optimal
12
of resources. It may be useful, however, to identify its costs.

A regime of borrowed state limitations law imposes a variety of costs
on litigants. Until such time as the most closely analogous state law has
been authoritatively identified, a conscientious lawyer who has been consulted about the possibility of commencing litigation must become conversant with multiple sources of substantive law13 -in the process,
identifying the pertinent choice of law rule. 14 Having determined the
most closely analogous body of state substantive law and its governing
limitations provision, our hypothetical lawyer must consider whether, applied to the federal claim in question, that provision would be hostile to
or inconsistent with the policies animating the federal statute or with fed7 See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,271 (1985); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 61617 (1895); Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 341 (1805). But see Occidental Life Ins. Co. v.
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977) (refusing to borrow state statute of limitations for EEOC enforcement
action).
8 The Rules of Decision Act provides: "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
For a revisionist reading of the Court's cases by ajustice who regards the Rules of Decision Act
as redundant and who iswilling to indulge the notion that a federal statutory claim is timeless, see
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assoc., 107 S.Ct. 2759, 2767-74 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Revisionism is not, however, uncommon in this corner of the law. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983); infra text accompanying note 81.
9 See Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 oftheJudiciaryAct of 1789: The Example of
Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984); Burbank, supra note 6, at 761 n.121.
10 See Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 614-20 (1895) (state statute of limitations applied
under Rules of Decision Act in federal patent action); Burbank, supra note 6, at 824 n.440.
11 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1982). See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704 (1966).
12 Cf Burbank, supra note 6, at 767-68 (costs of borrowed state preclusion law applied to federal
question judgment of federal court). Compare id. at 811-12 (state court judgments).
13 See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assoc., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2763-64 (1987). Compare
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S.Ct. 2617, 2621 (1987) (§ 1981 actions sound in tort) with id at
2625-31 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (§ 1981 actions sound in contract).
14 See Burbank, supra note 6, at 768 ("[The constraints on choice of law applicable to the exercise of diversity jurisdiction do not obtain outside of that context"). See also University of Tenn. v.
Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796-99 (1986) (using a federal choice of law rule that, when uniform federal
requirements are met, refers to the law of the rendering state to determine the preclusive effects of
the unreviewed proceedings of a state administrative agency on a subsequent § 1983 action in federal court).
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eral rights. 15 This is likely to be a difficult, time-consuming, and expensive process, and no less so for a conscientious defense lawyer.
Moreover, neither the lawyers' unilateral research nor, if they disagree,
their subsequent litigation on the question has anything to do with the
merits of federal claims that might be or have been made in litigation.
There may be some questions of federal law, uncertainty about which, at
least for a time, benefits the federal system, 16 but limitations is not one of
them.17
The difficulty of ascertaining the governing period in a system of
borrowed state limitations law suggests that other, more significant, costs
may be entailed. Even a conscientious plaintiff's lawyer may prove to be
wrong about the answer to the problem, and the costs of error may include the loss of the client's federal substantive rights.' 8 If the client is
risk averse, the most likely strategy in response will be (if possible) to
bring suit within the shortest of all putatively applicable limitations periods. Such a strategy imposes costs of its own, driving into court grievances that, in the ripeness of time, might never become disputes,' 9
increasing the incidence of frivolous claims, 20 and creating the possibility
of duplicative litigation. 2 ' From the perspective of putative defendants,
uncertainty as to the governing limitations period is at 22war with the goal
of repose that is thought to animate that body of law.
A regime of borrowed state limitations law also imposes costs on
courts, both federal, and in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, state. The
problem of finding the "right" period may be no less difficult for
judges, 23 and, depending on the quality of advocacy, it may be no less
time-consuming. Again, that time is spent on a question unrelated to the
merits of the litigation, one for which simplicity and predictability are
traditionally thought a necessary, if not an adequate, answer to a charge
of arbitrariness.2 4 But in this instance, the charge cannot be laid at the
15 See, e.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) ("[I]t is the duty of the
federal courts to assure that the importation of state law will not frustrate or interfere with the
implementation of national policies").
16 See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984); S. ETREICHER &J. SzxroN, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE 48-52, 73-74 (1986).

17 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985) ("uncertainty and time-consuming litigation");
Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 667 (1983) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) ("Few areas of the law
stand in greater need of firmly defined, easily applied rules than does the subject of periods of
limitations"). See also Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 329
(1987).
18 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 n.34 (1985). By reason of the operation of preclusion
rules, the rights lost may include rights, both federal and state, that were not asserted in the complaint. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 25 comment e (1982).
19 See Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Emergence and Transformationof Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming.... 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 631 (1980-81).
20 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note ("[W]hat constitutes a reasonable inquiry may
depend on such factors as how much time for investigation was available to the signer ....
).
21 My hypothetical risk averse plaintiff may be forced to split her claim because part of it is not
yet ripe. Imagine, for instance, a person who is not yet entitled to sue under Tide VII. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) (1982).
22 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 n.34 (1985).
23 See supra note 13.

24 In McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830), the Court stated:
Of late years, the courts, in England and in this country, have considered statutes of limitations more favorably than formerly. They rest upon sound policy and tend to the peace and
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doorstep of the legislature. 2 5 Moreover, because the process of finding
the most closely analogous state law has the trappings of rationality,
when itself revealed as arbitrary, it may detract from the appearance of
justice under law that is important to continued respect for the institu26
tion of courts.
Finally, some of the costs identified above and others to be mentioned here should be viewed from the discrete perspective of the federal
policies or interests sought to be advanced in the underlying substantive
law. The inadvertent loss of a federal claim by a plaintiff whose lawyer,
without fault, guessed wrong about the governing limitations period is
one such cost. The existence of disuniform limitations periods for the
same federal claim, depending on the state in which suit is brought, and
difficult to explain orjustify to a lay person, 2 7 is another. The problems
of supervising a system of borrowed state limitations law, particularly
acute in cases within concurrent jurisdiction, present a third.2 8 The
Supreme Court may feel pressure to allot a disproportionate amount of
its precious docket to borrowed limitations cases, either to minimize interstate disuniformity or to check the application of state statutes that are
hostile to or inconsistent with federal rights.
I believe that, in recent years, the Court has felt pressure on its
docket from federal limitations cases. In any event, the Court has
evinced awareness of many of the costs imposed by a system of borrowed
state limitations law. The Court appears to be following a number of
different, but related, strategies to minimize these costs.
First, the Court has made it clear that the search for analogies can
include other federal substantive schemes as well as state substantive law,
and that if the most closely analogous scheme with a limitations period is
federal, that limitations period should be borrowed. 2 9 Even when the
welfare of society. The courts do not now, unless compelled by the force of former decisions, give a strained construction, to evade the effect of those statutes. By requiring those
who complain of injuries to seek redress by action at law, within a reasonable time, a salutary vigilance is imposed, and an end is put to litigation.
Id. at 278-79. Cf Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1960) ("So long as the time set be not
unreasonable, it is less important what the limit be than that there be a rule whereby some timetable
may be known to the profession.").
25 Except in the case of rights of action implied by the courts, however, Congress can and should
be criticized for failing to provide a limitations period in the statute.
26 Cf Burbank, supra note 6, at 826 ("Even if the administrability of a system of borrowed state
law were the only relevant consideration, one might well conclude that federal judges should not be
distracted by the judicial equivalent of a wild goose chase."). But see Hemmings v. Barian, 822 F.2d
688, 690 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Ofcourse, in deciding which statute of limitations to borrow, the court is
choosing among arbitrary periods set by a legislature; but the choice itself is not arbitrary.").
Whether or not the process is arbitrary, it can entail the cost posited in the text if it engenders
uncertainty that leads to the inadvertent loss of federal substantive rights. See supra note 18, infra
text accompanying notes 34-35.
27 "Where legal rules are essentially arbitrary and cannot even be defended on grounds of sovereign or institutional integrity, one who suffers their consequences is quick to sense inequitable
administration of the law." Burbank, ProceduralRulemaking Under theJudicial Councils Reform andJudicial
Conduct and DisabilityAct of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 283, 327 (1982). Compare the application of
disuniform state law for a federal claim when state interests are implicated. See, e.g., United States v.
Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
28 Cf Burbank, supra note 6, at 767-70 (administrability problems of borrowed state preclusion
law applied to federal question judgment of federal court).
29 See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
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plausibility of the federal alternative is subject to question, as it was in
the Court's recent decision borrowing a limitations period found in the
Clayton Act for civil RICO actions,3 ° the benefits of a uniform limitations
period may appear sufficient, particularly considering the irreducible arbitrariness of all limitations law, to carry the day.
Second, in civil rights cases subject to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988, the
Court has also attempted to minimize the costs of the borrowing process.
By prescribing uniform federal characterizations of actions under 42
U.S.C. Section 198331 and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981,32 the Court has reduced both the transaction costs for litigants and courts and the costs
that errors by either entail for the federal system.3 3 Of course, those
characterizations are crude, but they could hardly be cruder than the assumption that individually tailored solutions are always synonymous with
just solutions.3 4 When limitations are at issue, the plaintiff may not be
35
alive to wear the suit.
Third, the Court has addressed the problem of subsidiary rules that
are part of the baggage of limitations law, rules that, for instance, determine when a limitations period begins to run, when it is suspended, and
when it ceases to run. For a time it seemed that the Court was willing to
rest with the perception that in the case of some such rules the trip is
nothing without the baggage, that, in other words, limitations periods
should not be viewed, and thus not borrowed, in isolation.3 6 That perception has recently been confirmed by Paul Carrington, whose analysis
of modern limitations law makes the point that, in an age of discovery
and other equitable doctrines, one often cannot tell a statute of limita37
tions by the statute.
30 See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987); Comment, The
Parameter of FederalCommon Law: The Case of Time Limitations on Federal Causes of Action, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 1447 (1988). See also In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988) (borrowing provisions from 1934 Securities Act for implied right of action); Reed v. United Transp. Union,
828 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1105 (1988) (borrowing provision in § 10(b) of
National Labor Relations Act for claims under § 101 of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act).
31 Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
32 Goodman v. Lukens Steels Co., 107 S Ct. 2617 (1987).
33 That is hardly to say, however, that these cases have solved all of the problems. See, e.g.,
Owens v. Okure, 816 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1218 (1988) (choosing between
different state statutes of limitations for intentional and unintentional personal injuries in section
1983 action).
34 Cf Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981) (" 'Simple justice' is achieved
when a complex body of law developed over a period of years is evenhandedly applied. The doctrine of resjudicata serves vital public interests beyond any individual judge's ad hoc determination
of the equities in a particular case"). See also infra text accompanying note 189.
35 See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617, 2621-22 (1987) (2-year statute applied retroactively); Cannon v. Kroger Co., 837 F.2d 660, 669-70 (4th Cir. 1988) (Murnaghan, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (contending that "majority's new filing rule... should'
not be applied retroactively"). See also Hemmings v. Barian, 822 F.2d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 1987) ("No
federal RICO litigant (plaintiff or defendant) could have had reasonable expectations about the applicable statute of limitations when this case arose, because the question of the applicable statute was
(and is) intensely contested and highly uncertain.").
36 See, e.g.,Johnson v. REA, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975).
37 See P. Carrington, An Appreciation of Walter Wheeler Cook, Erie and the Rules Enabling Act
5-7 (January 9, 1988) (unpublished remarks at Association of American Law Schools, Section on
Civil Procedure).
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Recently, however, the Court has become restless, and, with visions
of uniformity dancing in their heads, the Justices have determined to be
even more aggressive in seeking federal fillers for the gaps in federal
limitations law. The issue before the Court in West v. Conrail,"8 or so it

may have seemed, was selecting a rule to determine when a borrowed
statute of limitations ceases to run on federal claims. The claims in question were brought by a railroad employee against his employer, union,
and union representative under the Railway Labor Act.3 9 The six-month
limitations period governing them was borrowed from federal, not state,
law-the National Labor Relations Act 4°-in an extension of the drive
toward uniformity that I have briefly described. 4 1 Finding in the same
statute a rule that required service within the six-month period, the
dis42
trict court dismissed the action. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Court announced in West that Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure-"A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with
the court" 4 3 -provides the rule for stopping limitations periods that are
borrowed to fill gaps in federal law. 4 4 Because the employee in West had
38
39
40

107 S.Ct. 1538 (1987).
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982).
Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act provides:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such
unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board for such
purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint
stating the charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing beforp the Board or a
member thereof, or before a designated agent or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less
than five days after the serving of said complaint: Provided, That no complaint shall issue
based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of
the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom
such charge is made, unless the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing such
charge by reason of service in the armed forces, in which event the six-month period shall
be computed from the day of his discharge. Any such complaint may be amended by the
member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board in its discretion at any time
prior to the issuance of an order based thereon. The person so complained of shall have
the right to file an answer to the original or amended complaint and to appear in person or
otherwise and give testimony at the place and time fixed in the complaint. In the discretion
of the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board, any other person
may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding and to present testimony. Any such
proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United States under the rules of civil procedure
for the district courts of the United States, adopted by the Supreme Court of the United
States pursuant to section 2072 of Title 28.
29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
41 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had previously held that section 10(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act governs a claim of unfair representation under the Railway Labor Act.
Sisco v. Conrail, 732 F.2d 1188, 1193 (3d Cir. 1984). The court relied on DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), which involved a hybrid action under the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). See supra text accompanying note 29. In West,
the parties agreed that the same limitations period governs hybrid breach of contract/breach of the
duty of fair representation claims under the Railway Labor Act, but neither the court of appeals nor
the Supreme Court passed on the question. See West v. Conrail, 780 F.2d 361, 362 (3d Cir. 1985);
West v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 107 S Ct. 1538, 1541 n.2 (1987).
42 West v. Conrail, 780 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1985).
43 FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
44 Although we have not expressly so held before, we now hold that when the underlying
cause of action is based on federal law and the absence of an express federal statute of
limitations makes it necessary to borrow a limitations period from another statute, the action is not barred if it has been "commenced" in compliance with Rule 3 within the borrowed period.
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filed his complaint within the six-month period, the Court reversed the
decision below. 45 So intent was the Court on extending uniformity to
this subsidiary matter that it simply ignored the sources of its lawmaking
authority. If that were all-if in this case, as in others in the progression,
the objection were one of technique rather than result-the matter might
be, as Paul Carrington has suggested it is,46 merely of academic interest.
But both the technique and the result in West are open to objection, and,
in any event, academics are not the only people who should be
interested.
Since the Supreme Court's 1941 decision in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. ,47
neither courts nor commentators have evinced much interest in reconsidering the restrictions imposed on Federal Rules by the Rules Enabling
Act. 48 In the case of the lower federal courts, this is not surprising. The
rules in question are promulgated by the Supreme Court, and lower federal courts may assume, as the chairman of the original Advisory Committee guessed the bar would assume, "that the Court will stand by its
rules." 49 Indeed, in light of the failure of the Court to strike down any
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure challenged in the intervening fifty years,
experience confirms what psychology suggests. Even a judge or a court
that believes there is always a first time-or that there can be when the
restrictions in question were intended to restrain those called upon to
interpret them 5 0 -confronts (1) authoritative pronouncements that the
51
Act's restrictions implement, and implement only, federalism concerns;
West v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1538, 1541 (1987). See id at 1542 n.6 ("The governing
principle is that we borrow only what is necessary to fill the gap left by Congress.").
45 i at 1540, 1542.
46 -See P. Carrington, supra note 37, at 21-22.
47 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
48 The Rules Enabling Act provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts
and courts of appeals of the United States in civil actions, including admiralty and maritime
cases, and appeals therein, and the practice and procedure in proceedings for the review by
the courts of appeals of decisions of the Tax Court of the United States and for thejudicial
review or enforcement of orders of administrative agencies, boards, commissions, and officers.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve
the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment to
the Constitution.
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the Chief
Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but not later than the first day
of May, and until the expiration of ninety days after they have been thus reported.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules
have taken effect. Nothing in this title, anything therein to the contrary notwithstanding,
shall in any way limit, supersede, or repeal any such rules heretofore prescribed by the
Supreme Court.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1021-23; Whitten, Erie and the Federal
Rules: A Review and Reappraisalafter Burlington Northern Railroad v. Woods, 21 CREIGHTON
L. REv. 1, 1-2, 42 (1987).
49 Letter from William D. Mitchell to the Hon. Warren Olney, Jr. (January 15, 1938) (Clark
Papers, Sterling Library of Yale University, box 111, folder 54). See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1134
n.530.
50 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1101-02.
51 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465
(1965) ("The broad command of Erie was therefore identical to that of the Enabling Act: federal
courts are to apply state 'substantive' law and federal 'procedural' law."); id at 471 ("both the En-
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(2) a so-called "test" for validity that, unless one is very careful, answers
itself;5 2 and (3) a presumption of validity that effectively passes the buck
53
to Congress.
It is less easy either to explain or justify the failure of scholars to
confront the Court's approach to the Enabling Act. To a considerable
extent, I suspect, that failure was due for many years to vagaries in what I
have misleadingly called the Court's "approach," and to fascination with
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 54 a brooding omnipresence 55 that was responsible for those vagaries and that, while it was omnipresent, rendered the
56
Enabling Act a small point at which to stick.
More recently, a distinguished scholar bucked this trend.5 7 He did
so with such clarity, verve and style that those inclined to follow in his
path may have failed to note that, in an otherwise valuable article dispelling one myth, Professor Ely helped to entrench another. I speak of the
myth of federalism, which would have us believe that, four years before
Erie - when Swift v. Tyson 5 8 was in full flower - and in a statute authorizing rules of practice and procedure for all civil litigation in the federal
courts - litigation that even in the early 1930's involved predominantly
questions of federal substantive law 59-- Congress was only concerned, or
even primarily concerned, about the inappropriate displacement of state
60
law.
As a historical matter, there can be no doubt that the major purpose
of those who wrote and defended the bill that became the Enabling Act
was to allocate power to make federal law prospectively between the
Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress, not to protect only lawmaking that has already occurred, and certainly not to protect only state law.
Such a purpose accommodates the reality that substantive rights are "enlarged" when they are created for the first time in court rules. Although
animated by concern for separation of powers, it also holds the potential
abling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly, that federal courts are to apply state 'substantive' law and
federal 'procedural' law"). See also Burbank, supra note 3, at 1028-30, 1034-35.
52 "The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress
for disregard or infraction of them." Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). See Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1965).
53 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,471 (1965); see also Burlington N.R.R. v. Woods, 107 S. Ct.
967, 970 (1987); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1941). For criticism of the Court's
reliance on the provision in the Enabling Act requiring proposed Federal Rules to lie before Congress, see Burbank, supra note 3, at 1102, 1178-79, 1196 & n.779. For demonstration that the original Advisory Committee relied on at least one principle of rulemaking (incorporation of existing
federal law) that calls into question an essential predicate of the Court's presumption of validity, see
id. at 1147-57.
54 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
55 See Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE
LJ.267 (1946).
56 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1027-33, 1110-11 n.435.
57 See Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HAsv. L. REv. 693 (1974).
58 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
59 A study of civil cases in thirteen districts for the year ending June 30, 1930 revealed that
jurisdiction in 77.7% of the cases was based only on the presence of the United States as a party or
on the assertion of a federal question. AMERICAN LAW INST., A STUDv OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FED-

ERAL COURTS, PART II, CIVIL CASES 47 (1934). Diversity cases accounted for only 18A% of the total.
Id.
60 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1033-35, 1106-12, 1122-25.
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to serve federalism values, protecting both existing and potential state
law by remitting to Congress the decision whether there shall be prospective federal law on "substantive" matters and the content of that
law.

61

For one who does not admit the relevance of the Enabling Act's legislative history to its interpretation, both the Court's 62 and Professor
Ely's 63 approaches to the Enabling Act should nevertheless pose an uncomfortable dilemma: either their respective tests for validity of Federal
Rules should be extended to a context-federal question cases-not considered by them, or the Enabling Act imposes no restrictions on supervisory court rules in that context, at least no restrictions different from
those the Constitution imposes on Congress in the area of federal
procedure.64
For one brief but hopeful moment a few years ago, it appeared that
the Court would be required to reconsider its interpretation of the Enabling Act in a federal question case. In Marek v. Chesny the Court of
Appeals had refused to interpret Rule 68 so as to deny post-offer attorney's fees to a prevailing civil rights plaintiff, relying alternatively on the
statute governing fees in such cases and on the Enabling Act. 6 5 Moreover, in an amicus brief the Solicitor General had referred to the legislative history that the Court has never acknowledged, let alone discussed.
But the Court managed to sustain Rule 68 in Marek without reference to
the Enabling Act. 6 6
West is of a piece with Marek, but it is worse. The Court asserted the
irrelevance of restrictions on its power to fashion federal common law for
state law diversity cases that had driven its decision in Walker v. Armco Steel
Co..67 Fair enough. But the Court had also said in Walker that those restrictions were applicable only because Rule 3 does not as a matter of
61 See id. at 1106-14, 1121-27.
62 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
63 See Ely, supra note 57, at 725-38. See also Burbank, supra note 3, at 1123 nn.495-96.
64 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1110. Dictum in a recent decision of the Court suggests that
view. See Omni Capital Int'l v. Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404, 413 (1987) (suggesting that the Court
could promulgate a valid Federal Rule of Civil Procedure "authorizing service [of process] on an
alien in a federal-question case"). But see Burbank, supra note 3, at 1172-73 n.673; Whitten, Separation of Powers Restrictions onjudicialRulemaking: A Case Study of FederalRule 4, 40 ME. L. REv. 41 (1988);
infra note 186.
65 See Chesny v. Marek, 420 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 473 U.S. 1 (1985). The attorney's
fee statute at issue in Marek was the Civil Right's Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)).
66 See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985); Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68- Time to Abandon
Ship, 19 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 425, 433 n.42, 437-38 (1986).
67 Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
When the underlying cause of action is based on state law, and federal jurisdiction is based
on diversity of citizenship, state law not only provides the appropriate period of limitations
but also determines whether service must be effected within that period. Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752-53 (1980). Respect for the State's substantive decision that
actual service is a component of the policies underlying the statute of limitations requires
that the service rule in a diversity suit "be considered part and parcel of the statute of
limitations." Id. at 752 (footnote omitted). This requirement, naturally, does not apply to
federal question cases. Indeed, Walker expressly declined to "address the role of Rule 3 as
a tolling provision for a statute of limitations, whether set by federal law or borrowed from
state law, if the cause of action is based on federal law." Id. at 751 n.ll.
West v. Conrail, 107 S. Ct. 1538, 1541 nA (1987).
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"plain meaning," and was not intended to, furnish what it called a "tolling provision" for state statutes of limitations. 68 With sleight of hand
that still leaves me blinking, the Court in West supplied a different "plain
meaning" to Rule 3 for federal question cases 69 and did not consider the
Enabling Act problems that interpretation might be thought to present.
In particular, the Court did not consider the fact that the original Advisory Committee, in a Note which had been quoted in Walker, feared such
problems in both federal question and diversity cases. 70 One is left wondering after West whether the Court believes that there are any restrictions on Federal Rules in federal question cases.
As this analysis may suggest, it is considerably less important that we
reach agreement about the implementation of the Enabling Act's restrictions on supervisory court rulemaking than that we agree on Congress'
purposes in imposing those restrictions. The question whether the
Enabling Act authorizes a Federal Rule defining when statutes of limitations, federal or state, stop running is a detail. Having failed to acknowledge the relevance of the Enabling Act in federal question cases, the
Court in West obviously did not consider that detail. If the Court had
reached the question, its answer might have turned on the answer to an
anterior question: whether a test for validity implementing restrictions
allegedly imposed by Congress for reasons that are not pertinent in federal question cases is plausible in such cases. 7 ' If instead the Court had
turned to the Enabling Act's legislative history, it is most unlikely that
Rule 3 would have been sustained as a supplemental provision for stat72
utes of limitations, federal or state.
68 See Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 & nn.9-10 (1980).
69 To be sure, the Court in Walker had left open the question of "the role of Rule 3 as a tolling
provision for a statute of limitations, whether set by federal law or borrowed from state law, if the
cause of action is based on federal law." 446 U.S. at 751 n.l1. But neither in Walker nor in West did
the Court explain how a Federal Rule can have two "plain meanings," and, as demonstrated below,
the drafting history of Rule 3 is to the contrary.
70 In Walker, the Court observed:
"Rule 3 simply provides that an action is commenced by filing the complaint and has as its
primary purpose the measuring of time periods that begin running from the date of commencement; the rule does not state that filing tolls the statute of limitations." 4 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 1057, p.

19 1

(1969).

The Note of the Advisory Committee on the Rules states:
"When a Federal or State statute of limitations is pleaded as a defense, a question may arise
under this rule whether the mere filing of the complaint stops the running of the statute, or
whether any further step is required, such as, service of the summons and complaint or
their delivery to the marshal for service. The answer to this question may depend on
whether it is competent for the Supreme Court, exercising the power to make rules of procedure without affecting substantive rights, to vary the operation of statutes of limitations.
The requirement of Rule 4(a) that the clerk shall forthwith issue the summons and deliver it
to the marshal for service will reduce the chances of such a question arising." 28 U.S.C.
App., pp. 394-395.
This Note establishes that the Advisory Committee predicted the problem which arose in
Ragan and arises again in the instant case. It does not indicate, however, that Rule 3 was
intended to serve as a tolling provision for statute of limitations purposes; it only suggests
that the Advisory Committee thought the rule might have that effect.
446 U.S. at 750 n.10.
71 See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
72 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1158-60.
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Court rules are not the only means by which the -Supreme Court
makes federal law. In a case like West, brought in federal court to adjudicate federal substantive claims, there is undoubtably federal power to
furnish all of the subsidiary rules, be they characterized as substantive or
procedural. 73 Whether, in the absence of explicit congressional provision or direction, thefederal courts have the power to furnish those rules
depends on one's approach to federal common law.
As regards subsidiary rules of substantive law and "[l]egal rules
which impact significantly upon the effectuation of legal rights," 74 the
Court's approach seems to be that a finding of federal power usually entails a conclusion of federal judicial power and that the question whether
federal law shall be uniform or shall consist of state law borrowed as
federal law is a matter of -discretion. To be sure, in recent years the
Court has provided guidance on the exercise of that discretion, the purpose of which is to require more than mere rhetoric to justify the creation
or application of uniform judge-made rules. But,
according to the Court,
75
the guidelines are entirely a judicial construct.
The Court has yet to articulate or demonstrate a coherent approach
to the common-law powers of federal courts for matters that, because
they do not involve rules of substantive law or rules that "impact significantly upon the effectuation of legal rights," can without controversy be
deemed procedural. Hanna v. Plumer may suggest that federal courts are
free to formulate federal rules for, or apply them to, such matters, so
long as they do not run afoul of the restrictions applicable in state law
76
diversity cases.
My own view is that the Rules of Decision Act speaks directly to the
circumstances in which federal courts can fashion or apply federal judgemade rules, however they are characterized. When state law is found to
apply, in a federal question case as well as in a state law diversity case,
that result follows not because of judicial grace or borrowing, but because Congress has directed it.
[T]here is no historical warrant for the suggestion that Erie's constitutional holding exhausts the Rules of Decision Act, whatever confusion
about the reach of that holding may have followed in its wake. The Act
is not confined to cases in which state law governs "of its own force."
Moreover, the language of the Act requires federal judges to justify
federal common law by reference to a constitutional or statutory
source that either explicitly or implicitly authorizes - "provides" for
77
- or implicitly and plausibly calls for - "requires" - its creation.
73 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965). I assume, of course, that the substantive
law claims are within federal competence under the Constitution.
74 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477 (1979).
75 See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981); United States v.
Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); Burbank, supra note 6, at 755-62.
76 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466 (dictum); Burbank, supra note 6, at 787-91.
77 Burbank, supra note 6, at 759 (footnotes omitted) (criticizing United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-93 (1973) and United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715,
727 (1979)). For the role of Federal Rules in fashioning federal common law under the Rules of
Decision Act, see id. at 772-75.
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It is also my view that recent Supreme Court decisions on federal
common law, albeit not the Court's inconsistent and insupportable statements about the Rules of Decision Act, can be reconciled with this approach. 78 Ironically, the Court's roughest treatment of the Act occurred
in the DelCostello case, where the Court made the limitations borrowing
from the National Labor Relations Act that led to the subsidiary question
posed in West. 7 9 Confronted with an inflexible view of the Rules of Decision Act's direction to apply state law in Justice Stevens' dissent,8 0 the
DelCostello majority effectively read it out of federal question cases. 8 1 As I
have previously observed,
[The] suggestion [that the Act is confined to diversity cases] finds no
support in the language of the Act, in history, or in the Court's own
fumblings with the Act in nondiversity cases. The fact that considerations requiring application of state law in diversity cases are not relevant to the elaboration of a federal legislative scheme tells us nothing
about the relevance of the Rules of Decision Act in the latter context.
Similarly, the fact that "neither Erie nor the Rules of Decision Act can
now be taken as establishing a mandatory rule that we apply state law in
federal interstices" does not answer the question whether the Act
speaks to the circumstances when the 8filling
of those interstices with
2
judge-made federal law is permissible.
DelCostello thus set the stage for West in more ways than one. Reading
those two cases, one might think that neither the Rules of Decision Act
nor the Rules Enabling Act constrains the Supreme Court when it makes
law for federal question cases - either in the common-law mode or prospectively - total victory for myths of federalism.
Yet a view of the Rules of Decision Act that is not "crabbed or
wooden"8 3 comfortably yields the same conclusion in DeCostello as does
traditional federal common law analysis: when federal substantive rights
are put at risk by a system of borrowed state law, the substantive scheme
requires "otherwise" than that state laws apply. 4 As I hope to have
demonstrated, federal substantive rights are put at risk by a regime of
borrowed state limitations law. The possibility of inadvertent loss of
those rights alone supports uniform rules, and the other costs of borrowed state limitations law may also. Due attention to the separation of
powers constraints on common-law courts prompts the federal courts to
find plausible alternatives in other federal statutes, and they sometimes
reach to do so.8 5
78 See id. at 758-62.
79 See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983); supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
80 See Del~ostello, 462 U.S. at 172-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81 See id.at 159 n.13.
82 Burbank, supra note 6, at 760 (footnotes omitted). See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff&
Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2771 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring).
83 Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 598 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84 Cf. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 479 n.6 (1979) (situations in which "the very application of
varying state laws would itself be inconsistent with federal interests"); Burbank, supra note 6, at 76571 (preclusion law for federal question judgments of federal courts).
85 See supra text accompanying notes 13-30.
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Why, then, is the problem with West not of merely academic interest?8 6 If the Court could have formulated a valid common law rule for

federal question cases involving borrowed limitations periods, why quibble about its imputation of such a provision to Rule 3?
First, I do not believe that questions of technique are or should be of
concern only to academics, at least when the lawmaking powers of federal courts are concerned. Even if analysis reveals that the Court could
have reached the same result in West as a matter of federal common law,
we still should be concerned about the possibility that the Court regards
the Rules Enabling Act as irrelevant in federal question cases. For we
now know that existing Federal Rules can have two plain meanings.
What is to prevent the Court in the future from promulgating Federal
Rules for application only in federal question cases? Indeed, that is a
possibility the Advisory Committee is exploring in connection with Rule
487 and one that should be explored generally by those who are interested in reexamining the notion of trans-substantive procedure, the notion that the same rules of procedure should, or can appropriately, apply
across the whole spectrum of substantive law."" As prospectively formulated procedure is more closely tied to the substantive law, however,
both the viability and the importance of effective restrictions on court
rulemaking should become more apparent.8 9
Second, it is not at all clear that the Court could have formulated a
valid common law rule identical in scope of application to the scope its
decision in West accorded Rule 3. To be sure, in cases that, there being
no pertinent Federal Rule, would be treated like West, or rather as West
should have been treated-a garden variety federal common-law casethe only formal legal barriers under the Court's approach are constitutional. 90 There is undoubted federal power and also, it would seem, federal judicial power to fashion a rule defining a limitations period in
federal question cases, whatever the source of that limitations period.
The scope given to Rule 3 in West was not confined to cases like West,
however. The Court's opinion suggests that Rule 3's limitations function
extends to cases under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988,'a statute similar to the
Rules of Decision Act but more narrowly focused and hence not as easy
to ignore or wish away. 9 1 Moreover, it is precisely cases subject to sec86 See supra text accompanying note 46.
87 See Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733
(1988). See also supra note 64; infra note 186.

88 See infra text accompanying notes 170-89.
89 See infra text accompanying notes 151-53, 183-89.
90 See supra text accompanying note 75. In addition to constitutional restraints on federal lawmaking by Congress, at some point - a point that is not reached if the Rules of Decision Act is taken
seriously - constitutional restraints on federal lawmaking by the federal courts are implicated. See
Burbank, supra note 6, at 756-57 n.102.
91 See West v. Conrail, 107 S.Ct. 1538, 1541 (1987), quoted supra note 44; id. at 1542 n.6;
DelRaine v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 1987).
Section 1988 provides:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the
provisions of this Title, and of Tide "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title "CRIMES," for the
protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication,
shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as
such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not
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tion 1988 that have caused the Court to articulate the perception that
limitations periods are not as simple as they may appear and thus to extend its borrowing from state law to supplementary rules. 9 2 One may
treat this aspect of West as dictum, but it has the appearance of dictum
intended to be acted upon as if it were holding. One may also observe
that the Court has hardly been more consistent or clear in its treatment
of Section 1988 than of the Rules of Decision Act.9 3 Let that person try,
without relying on Rule 3, to reach West's result under the statute in all
cases to which it applies, but do not hold your breath.
Finally, on the question of validity, the reasoning of the Court's decision in West extends to all federal question cases, including those in
which there is a directly applicable federal limitations period. 9 4 Cases in
which the period is not further defined by a statutory rule present no
problem for a judge-made rule under traditional federal common-law
analysis, or for that matter under the Rules of Decision Act. But what of
cases in which the federal statute carries its own provision defining when
the period ceases to run? Paul Carrington has suggested that the Court
will not permit the application of Rule 3 in such cases, 9 5 but I am not
sure that I understand why. If a Federal Rule is valid, it supersedes previously enacted federal statutes with which it is inconsistent.9 6 Perhaps
Rule 3 has three plain meanings. In any event, apart from Rule 3, it is
adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the
constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or
criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the
party found guilty. In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
92 See supra text accompanying note 36.
[T]he cases that require federal courts to borrow the whole state statute of limitations and
not just the limitations period.., are best explained not by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (although they
were civil rights cases to which section 1988 applies and they did rely in part on that statute)
but by the inseparability of the time period itself from some (though not necessarily all)
other provisions of a state's limitations law .... The actual generosity of a statute of limitations depends not only on the nominal period within which suit must be brought but on
provisions allowing that period to be extended for various reasons, so that if the federal
court borrows just the period it may in fact be giving plaintiffs more or less time than the
state that enacted the borrowed statute would have thought appropriate in the
circumstances.
DelRaine v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 1987).
93 See Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Section 1988, 133 U. PA.
L. REv. 601 (1985). But see id. at 620; infra text accompanying note 111.
94 The Court's stated holding was limited to cases in which "the absence of an express federal
statute of limitations makes it necessary to borrow a limitations period from another statute." West
v. Conrail, 107 S. Ct. 1538, 1541 (1987). See supra note 44. But unless Rule 3 has multiple plain
meanings in federal question cases, it furnishes a subsidiary limitations rule in all such cases. That
appears to have been the expectation of the Court in Walker. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446
U.S. 740, 751 n. 11 (1980), quoted supra note 69.
95 See P. Carrington, supra note 37, at 27-28.
96 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982), quoted supra note 48; Burbank, supra note 66, at 437. Of course, if
the hypothetical statute had been enacted after 1938, the year Rule 3 became effective, it would
control.
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clear that the Court could not apply a judge-made rule inconsistent with
a pertinent and valid federal statutory provision.
Third, whatever the Court's conception of its common-law powers
or of the restrictions placed on those powers by Section 1988, I doubt
that, if it had approached the question on a case-by-case basis, which is
to say statute-by-statute, the Court would have reached the results
portended by West. One who regards criticism of West as academic may
be viewing that case as another example of borrowing, what I have elsewhere called reverse incorporation: the use of a Federal Rule in its substantive aspects as the basis for federal common law. 97 Apart from the
fundamental problem that a federal common-law rule of similar scope of
application might be invalid, West furnishes ample proof of the dangers
of that technique. For, although the drafting history of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure indicates that the Reporter and some members of the
Advisory Committee wished that Rule 3 could furnish a rule to stop the
running of limitations periods, it also is replete with evidence of controversy on that question, 98 controversy that led to the compromise Advisory Committee Note so p'rominent in the Court's decision in Walker and
so conspicuously ignored in West. 9 9 In all of this, I can find not the
slightest hint that, in formulating Rule 3, the Advisory Committee was
relying on case law that identified the filing of the complaint as the appropriate event for a federal statute of limitations. Indeed, if the
rulemakers had been seeking guidance in the cases, they would have
found a different rule. 10 0
Of course, much has changed since those old cases were decided,
especially arrangements for service of federal process. Consideration of
those changes and of lower court cases treating the problem might have
led the Court to the result it reached, and to the results it signalled, in
West. In fact, the lower court cases provide little sustenance,1 0 1 and,
although the Court did rely on a Federal Rule governing service of process in West, the move was part of the sleight of hand to which I have
referred. 10 2 When the matter is properly analyzed, additional doubts
arise about West from the perspective of federal common law.
The federal statute from which the limitations period was borrowed
in West requires not only that a charge be filed with the General Counsel
of the NLRB within six months but that it be served on the subject of the
complaint within that period.' 0 3 In defending the use of Rule 3 instead
of the borrowed statute's service rule, the Court in West resorted to a
trick it has found useful before, artificially parsing a statute of limitations
into limitations and service provisions.' 0 4 In this case, according to the
97 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1158-63.
-98 See id at 1159-60 n.619.
99 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
100 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1162 & n.633.
101 See, e.g., Sentry Corp. v. Harris, 802 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1624
(1987); United States v. Wahl, 583 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1978); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947).
102 See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
103 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
104 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 462-63 n.1 (1965); Burbank, supra note 3, at 1173-76.
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statute could be disregarded because
Court, the service provision in the
106
Rule 46)105 governs that subject.

Rule 4(j), which is a statute, 0 7 does not, and was not intended to,
provide a rule affecting limitations periods.' 0 8 The statutory service requirement that the Court declined to borrow in West cannot reasonably
be regarded as anything other than such a rule.' 0 9 The result reached in
West transmogrifies a six-month limitations period into a ten-month period. Even acknowledging irreducible arbitrariness in limitations law,
that looks like distortion. If so, it would be distortion somewhat different
from the distortion that, in cases under Section 1988, has prompted the
Court's refusal to borrow piecemeal. 0 In those cases, selective borrowing may lead to distortion of state law, the source to which, at least on
this subject, the Court is directed by the statute and from which it is empowered to depart only if the borrowed rules discriminate against or
would cause distortion in federal law, the destination."' In a case like
West, 112 one need only be concerned about the latter type of distortion.
The Court in West failed satisfactorily to explain, however, why the tenmonth limitations period emerging from its combination of Rules 3 and
4 0 ) serves the policies that caused it to borrow the six-month limitation
period in the first place. 13 The common-law method might at least have
SUMMONS: TIME LIMrr FOR SERVICE. If a service of the summons and complaint is not
made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on
whose behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not
made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice upon the court's own initiative with notice to such party or upon motion. This subdivision shall not apply to service in a foreign country pursuant to subdivision (i) of this rule.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(j).
106 The only gap in federal law that we intended to fill in DelCostello was the appropriate
limitations period. We did not intend to replace any part of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure with any part of § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act. Rule 3 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a civil actin is commenced by filing a complaint with the court, and Rule 4 governs the procedure for effecting service and the period
within which service must be made....
West v. Conrail, 107 S. Ct. 1538, 1541 (1987). See id at 1542 n.7 ("Respondents also argue that
§ 10(b)'s service requirement must be adopted in order to assure that defendants receive prompt
notice of suit against them. The requirement of timely service in Rule 4(j) satisfied this need without
recourse to the service requirement of § 10(b)").
107 Rule 4(j) was added by P.L. No. 97-462, § 2, 96 Stat. 2527, 2528 (1983).
108 See 128 CONG. REC. H9850 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Edwards). Because
there are no committee reports, this analysis by the bill's sponsor should be accorded great weight.
109 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982), quoted supra note 40.
110 See supra text accompanying notes 36 & 91-92.
111 See Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 660-61 (1983); Kreimer, supra note 93, at 620.
112 When required to displace state law, federal judges have the power to fashion a substitute
that is fully adequate in light of all of the policies and interests that a common law court
would consider in making law to govern a matter. They need not blind themselves to the
But, at the
procedural opportunities afforded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ....
same time, they should not confuse stated opportunities with stated requirements....
Burbank, supra note 6, at 771 (footnotes omitted). See id. at 766-67.
113 While it is possible that a defendant will not be served with the complaint until ten
months after the cause of action accrues, this result is not inconsistent with our adoption of
a six-month statute of limitations for breach of contract, breach of duty of fair representation claims. See DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983). The administrative scheme for
unfair labor practices only requires that the charge be filed and served within six months of
the date the cause of action accrued. The defendant does not receive the complaint, if any,
until the General Counsel has investigated the charge and decided to proceed. Under both
the administrative procedure for unfair labor practices and the judicial procedure for hybrid
105
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evoked more attention to the problem, 1 14 as it might have prompted
awareness of other problems that flow from the Court's reliance on Federal Rules in this context.
Notwithstanding the possibility of distortion of substantive law, a
uniform and trans-substantive federal common-law rule might be justified if such a rule mitigated the administrability problems, for litigants
and courts, of the system of borrowed limitations law. But such a justification is not clear in a case like West and, it would seem, in some of the
other cases within the reach of its reasoning if not its holding. The cases
in question involve borrowed limitations periods found in statutes that
also contain rules providing when the periods cease to run. 1 1 In such
cases, the existence of the rule in the same statute as the governing limitations period should prevent the inadvertent loss of federal rights by
any litigant whose lawyer was consulted in time to comply. The possibility that a trans-substantive judge-made rule requiring only filing of a
complaint might preserve even a few meritorious claims from inadvertent
loss is important. Moreover, a trans-substantive common-law rule requiring only filing would not be difficult to remember once it was
learned. But the resulting melange of legal sources might seem more
complicated, a perception that could impose costs of its own.11 6 If so,
reliance on Rule 3, with its multiple plain meanings," 17 does not solve the
problem.
claims, the statute of limitations and the tolling provisions extinguish stale claims; they
guarantee that the defendant is not subject to suit for conduct that occurred more than six
months before the complaining party initiates appropriate legal process, by filing either a
charge with the NLRB or a complaint in federal court.
West v. Conrail, 107 S. Ct. 1538, 1542 n.7 (1987) (emphasis in original). As noted by the court of
appeals in West:
While it is true, as Judge Gibbons notes, that the complaint in an unfair labor practice
proceeding is filed by the General Counsel after an investigation of the employee's charge,
it is the filing and service of the charge that notifies the employer of the charge and initiates the dispute
resolutionprocess in such a proceeding. The filing and service of the complaint performs the
same function in a hybrid labor suit like the one before us. Section 10(b) promotes the
prompt resolution of labor disputes by requiring an early initiation of the dispute resolution
process and DelCostello teaches that this policy should be implemented in hybrid labor suits
as well. That policy is best served by borrowing the service requirement, as well as the
filing requirement, of Section 10(b).
West v. Conrail, 780 F.2d 361, 363-64 (3d Cir. 1985) (emphasis added), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1538
(1987). See also infra note 114.
114 In American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 823 F.2d 466 (lth Cir.
1987), the court of appeals borrowed the three-month limitations period in the Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 12 (1982), to govern a suit to vacate an arbitration award that was brought under the
Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (1970) (codified in relevant part
at 39 U.S.C. § 1208(b) (1982)). Although the Federal Arbitration Act requires service of a notice of
motion to vacate within the three-month period, the court of appeals felt compelled by West to reject
the borrowing of that subsidiary rule:
Whatever our doubts about adding an additional four months onto a three-month (or even
six-month) limitations period specifically chosen for its brevity, that decision is no longer
ours to make. Therefore, if the plaintiff filed its complaint to commence the action within
three months (which it did), and effected proper service within 120 days of filing (which it
did), then the actions are timely.
823 F.2d at 477 (footnotes omitted).
115 See, e.g., id
116 It might not, however, be more complicated.
117 See supra text accompanying notes 67-70, 94-97.
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If anyone continues to doubt that technique matters, a few minutes
with a recent Fourth Circuit decision should do the trick. Whatever restrictions the Enabling Act imposes on Federal Rules in federal court, I
hope we can agree that neither the Enabling Act 1 8 nor the Federal Rules
themselves 19 authorize their imposition on state courts. If the Court in
West had thought of that and adverted to the fact that most federal claims
are within the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts, it should also have
realized that Rule 3 was not a panacea on the question before it. Because
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in state court litigation, only a uniform federal common-law rule, binding on state courts as
well as federal, can yield true uniformity. Here again, however, looking
at the problem from the perspective of federal common law raises doubts
whether uniformity, let alone trans-substantive uniformity, is all that it
appears.
The plaintiff in Cannon v. Kroger Co. 120 sued her employer and her
union in a hybrid section 301/unfair representation action in state court.
As permitted under North Carolina law, she commenced that action on
the last day of the six-month period not by filing a complaint, but by the
issuance of a summons upon her application "stating the nature and purpose of the action and requesting permission to file [her] complaint
within 20 days" and a court order "stating the nature and purpose of the
action and granting the requested permission." 12 1 After removal of the
action to federal court, the district judge dismissed it as barred by the
(borrowed) six-month limitations period. On appeal, a panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff's failure to file a "complaint" in accordance with Rule 3 within the
six-month period was fatal. 1 2 2 Rehearing and rehearing en banc were
denied, 234 with Judge Mumaghan writing a lengthy and vigorous
2
dissent. 1
118 See supra note 48. The Federal Rules there authorized are for "the district courts and courts
of appeals of the United States."
119 These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil
nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty, with the exceptions
stated in Rule 81. They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
120 832 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1987), rehk'g and reh'g en banc denied, 837 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1988).
121 N.C. R. Civ. P. 3. See Cannon, 832 F.2d at 304.
122

After West, there can be no question that commencement of a "hybrid" claim brought in

district court is to be assessed in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Unlike appellant, we can perceive no justification for allowing a different result simply because the underlying action is initiated in a state court. The substantive rights involved
remain purely federal in nature. Moreover, the choice of a forum in no way diminishes the
subtle balance of interests noted in DelCostello as ajustification for uniformity. The application of alternative state law procedures must inevitably intrude into the balance and

threaten the goal of uniform adjudication. We conclude, therefore, that the statute of limitations applicable to hybrid actions runs until the action is properly commenced under the
dictates of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Cannon, 832 F.2d at 305-06. One member of the panel dissented. See id. at 306-07 (Smalkin, DJ.,
dissenting).
123 Cannon v. Kroger Co., 837 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1988).
124 Id. at 660-70 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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The Court of Appeals' decision in Cannon is remarkable not so much
for imposing Rule 3 on a state court, as for imposing Rule 8(a), which
defines what a "pleading which sets forth a claim f6r relief" in federal
court shall contain.1 25 Whatever its power in other cases of borrowed
limitations law, the Court in West had the power to fashion a uniform
common-law rule for the hybrid federal claims at issue in that case, and
its reliance on Rule 3 can be excused as shorthand.' 2 6 Moreover, it
would not do to have one rule defining when a federal limitations period
stops running for cases brought in federal court and a consequentially
different rule for cases brought in state court. The Court also has the
power, although it has been reluctant to use it, to displace state-law rules
in state court litigation on federal claims when those rules are hostile to
or inconsistent with a scheme of federal rights. 127 In that aspect of Cannon, the Fourth Circuit can be seen as merely extending the Court's
shorthand reference to Rule 3.
Accepting the proposition that the Court could fashion a uniform
rule for hybrid actions, binding in state as well as federal court, the question becomes whether it could also require that the paper filed within the
statutory period, which Rule 3 calls a "complaint," satisfy the requirements of Rule 8. That is the effect of Cannon 128 This result is difficult if
125

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court
already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it,
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and
(3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the alternative or of
several different types may be demanded.

FED. R. CIr. P. 8(a).

126 See supra text following note 89.
127 See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980); Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342
U.S. 359 (1952); Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294 (1949); Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923).
See also Burbank, supra note 6, at 805-17. In displacing particular state-law rules, or requiring use of
a uniform federal common-law rule, in state court litigation, the Court is bound by the Rules of
Decision Act. See id. at 809 n.366; supra note 8.
After this paper was delivered, the Supreme Court decided two cases that bear on the problem
of federal law in state court. One of them, Monessen Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 108 S.Ct.
1837 (1988), held that the availability of prejudgment interest in a state court FELA action is a
matter of federal law. The other, Felder v. Casey, 108 S.Ct. 2302 (1988), held that a state notice of
claim statute could not be applied in a state court § 1983 action. Felder is of particular interest
because, although using the language of "preemption," see id. at 2307, it confirms the potential of
the general approach to federal common law that I have advocated. See Burbank, supra note 6. Felder
thus also suggests the bankruptcy of the Court's approach to the full faith and credit statute. See id.
at 805-22.
128 Appellant's alternative contention that the state summons issued pursuant to North Carolina Rule 3 was somehow equivalent to a complaint under the Federal rules is unpersuasive.
A valid complaint under the Federal Rules must satisfy, inter alia, the demands of Rule
8(a)(2) by including a "plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief." The state summons issued to defendants below fell significantly short of this
requirement.
Cannon v. Kroger, 832 F.2d 303, 306 (4th Cir. 1987) (footnote omitted), reh'gand reh'gen banc denied,
837 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1988). In referring to the "state summons," the court of appeals evidently
intended the "Application and Order Extending Time to File Complaint," which was served with the
summons. Ms. Cannon's application stated as the nature and purpose of the action: "Recovery of
damages and other relief by employee for Union's breach of its duty of fair representation and employer's breach of collective bargaining agreement under Section 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185." Application and Order Extending Time to File Complaint, Cannon v. Kroger, No. 86-CVS-1 176 (March 7, 1986).
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not impossible to square with the Court's traditional approach to federal
common law and radically inconsistent with the Court's approach to fed1 29
eral law in state courts, which has been largely sui generis.
For good or ill, West makes it clear that actual notice to a defendant
within the limitations period is not important to the policies of the (borrowed) statute of limitations.13 0 Ms. Cannon filed her complaint within
20 days, and it was served on the defendants within 30 days, of the issuance of the summons. The defendants therefore had notice of the claims
brought against them long before they might have had notice if the action had been brought originally in federal court, where Rule 4(j) allows
120 days for service of process.' 3 1 In that light, the precise content of
the filed paper that commences the lawsuit is irrelevant. Under traditional federal common law analysis or a Rules of Decision Act approach,
there is not a sufficient basis to displace the North Carolina system, let
alone to impose on North Carolina courts a uniform federal definition of
a complaint. 132 Moreover, the administrability costs of such a rule for
people desiring to litigate in state court are significant.' 3 3 Under a
"preemption" approach, a uniform federal rule can only be harder to
13 4
justify.
Just as visions of uniformity may have blinded the Court in West, so
may they have prevented the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
from seeing the endpoint of the course on which it embarked. Imposing
the requirements of Rules 3 and 8 on state courts will not ensure uniformity in the limitations period applicable to a federal claim. Conceivably, a state might permit a period longer than 120 days for service of
process. If so, it is possible that the Supreme Court would require that a
state court plaintiff follow Federal Rule 4(j). Is it not more likely that the
Court would look to the facts to determine whether notice was given so
late as to be inconsistent with the policies of the governing limitations
period? If so, Ms. Cannon would have additional reason to wonder what
happened to her.
Whatever the accuracy of a would-be reformer's description of federal practice and procedure under the Conformity Act, there can be no
doubt that to "the average lawyer," federal limitations law today "is Sanskrit."' 13 5 Nor can there be any doubt that, notwithstanding the Supreme
129 See Burbank, supra note 6, at 805-17; supra note 127.
130 See supra text accompanying notes 103-14.
131 See Cannon, 837 F.2d at 661 & n.3 (Murnagham, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc). See also id. at 662 n.4, 666 & n. 11.
132 See id. at 663-64, 666-68. Cf. Burbank, supra note 6, at 810-12 (uniform federal preclusion
rules for state court judgments not justified).
133 See Cannon, 837 F.2d at 668 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
The problem is not, however, confined to litigants who fear that their state court action may be
removed to federal court and for that reason attempt "to comply with both sets of rules." Id As
Judge Mumaghan elsewhere demonstrates, removal is irrelevant. See id at 664; FED. R. Civ. P. 81.
The panel opinion in Cannon represents that court's conclusion as to the law applicable in a case
litigated wholly within the state court system and, implicitly, its prediction of what the Supreme
Court would hold in reviewing a state court decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982). See supra note
122; note 127 and accompanying text. Cf. Burbank, supra note 6, at 811-12 (administrability
problems of uniform federal preclusion rules for state court judgments).
134 See Burbank, supra note 6, at 807-10; supra note 127.
135 See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
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Court's efforts to reduce the costs entailed by a system of borrowed state
limitations law, truly effective reform will come, if at all, only when Congress determines comprehensively to address the problem. For, even an
expansive view of the common-law powers of federal courts confronts
continuing concern about charges of "judicial legislation"'13 6 that, in an
area of irreducible arbitrariness, cannot be answered by reference to legislative policies. And not even the Court that decided West is likely to
essay limitations periods in Federal Rules.
Studying the Supreme Court's responses to the problem is nonetheless instructive. We see in those responses a quest for simplicity and predictability, and for adjudication of claims on the merits, that recalls the
stated goals of those who sought to replace the Conformity Act with
court rules of practice and procedure. 3 7 We also see a quest for uniformity, one that is much easier to understand and defend than the similar quest of proponents of the Enabling Act,' 3 8 because it concerns only
federal substantive claims and, moreover, matters bearing so directly on
those claims as to "define or limit"' 3 9 their very existence. Finally, in
West, we see the triumph of the trans-substantive solution, discovered in
that compendium of trans-substantive solutions known as the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Supreme Court's responses to the problem of federal limitations law thus follow the plot line of modem federal procedure. I have
asked you to pay close attention to the last chapter, because it is, I believe, the most important. In moving from a goal of uniformity to a result of trans-substantive uniformity, the Court in West offered no more
explanation of why one must accompany the other than did those who
gave us the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 140 Even in the substantive
136 UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 702-04 (1966). See supra text accompanying
notes 6, 23-26.
137 The 1926 Senate report on the bill that, with the change of one word, was ultimately passed as
the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, enumerated the general purposes of the grant of rulemaking power
to the Supreme Court as follows:
First, to make uniform throughout the United States the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions and the practice and procedure in the district courts in actions at law. It
is believed that if this were its only advantage that [sic] lawyers and litigants would find, in
uniformity alone, a tremendous advance over the present system.
Second, these general rules, if wisely made, would be a long step toward simplicity, a
most desirable step in view of the chaotic and complicated condition which now exists.
Third, it would tend toward the speedier and more intelligent disposition of the issues
presented in law actions and toward a reduction in the expense of litigation.
Fourth, it would make it more certain that if a plaintiff has a cause of action he would

not be turned out of court upon a technicality and without a trial upon the very merits of
the case; and, likewise, if the defendant had a just defense he would not be denied by any
artifice of [sic] the opportunity to present it.
S. REP. No. 1174, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1926). See, e.g., Report of the Committee on Uniforr Judicial
Procedure, 6 A.B.A. J. 509 (1920); Burbank, supra note 3, at 1067-68 & n.236; Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The FederalRules of Civil Procedure in HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv.
909, 948-61 (1987).
138 See supra note 137.
139 S. REP. No. 1174, supra note 137, at 10 (quoting 3 REPORT OF THE BOARD OF STATUTORY
CONSOLIDATION ON THE SIMPLIFICATION OF THE CIVIL PRACTICE IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK

477

(1915)); Burbank, supra note 3, at 1122.
140 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1135-36 & n.539. The debate chronicled there concerned the
meaning of "general rules" as used in the Enabling Act, see supra note 48, and in particular whether
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context that brought it forth, the trans-substantive solution is problematic in terms of the policies animating the governing substantive law.141
Moreover, although the benefits of simplicity and predictability afforded
by a trans-substantive solution might be thought to outweigh the costs of
any distortion, it is not clear that West's solution promises those benefits
for federal court litigation, 142 and it surely does not when extended to
3
state court litigation.14

Perhaps, however, I am being unfair, and we are or should be talking
about different books. Limitations law has always been difficult to characterize, 14 4 and its substantive implications are hard to miss, if not to
ignore.145 In addition, Rule 3, as interpreted in West, makes a clear policy choice that has predictable consequences for a statute of limitations.1 4 6 Further still, the administrability costs of borrowed law are
obvious and perhaps different in kind from comparable costs in a system
that, by and large, eschews borrowing. 147 What can we learn from West
about real procedure, about "adjective law?"' 148 Moreover, what can we
learn from that case about really uniform federal procedure?
An answer to some of these possible objections to the comparison
lies in West itself, where the Supreme Court manifested no interest in the
question of characterization posed by the Enabling Act. A more satisfactory answer lies in a perception that may help to explain the Court's failure to pause: the perception "that 'procedure' and 'substance' are
elusive words that must be approached in context, and that there can be
1 49
no one, indeed any, bright line to mark off their respective preserves.
In much of today's litigation landscape, procedure is adjectival to substantive law in the same way that, in negligence law, reasonable is to
man.' 5 0 In other words, "real procedure" is hard to find.
Possible objections based on the atypical nature of Rule 3, read to
make a policy choice in the limitations area, or on the supposedly unique
the Act contemplated uniformity or would accommodate rules requiring strict conformity to state
law. The question whether uniformity necessarily entails trans-substantive uniformity was not addressed, probably because it was assumed. See Subrin, supra note 137, at 956-61, 995-96.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 103-13. The problem of distortion is even more serious
when Rule 3 is used for other statutory limitation periods. See supra note 114.
142 See supra text accompanying notes 115-17.
143 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
144 Compare Goad v. CeloteicCorp., 831 F.2d 508, 511 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2871
(1988) ("principal purpose of limiting statutes is the prevention of stale claims [from the perspective
of courts], and.., the repose of defendants is merely an incidental benefit ....
) with F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.16, at 218-19 (3d ed. 1985) (ordering "[p]rotection of a defendant
from stale claims" and "[p]rotection of defendant from insecurity" ahead of "[p]rotection of courts
from the burden of stale claims" in policy analysis).
145 See supra text accompanying notes 67-72,
146 See id; Burbank, supra note 3, at 1160.
147 But see FED. R. Civ. P. 64, 69; Burbank, supra note 3, at 1145-47.
148 "Law reformers have long assured us that procedure is technical, details-in short, adjective
law. Whatever the accuracy of those labels as to other matters, only in Wonderland do they describe
rules of preclusion." Burbank, Afterwords: A Response to ProfessorHazardand a Comment on Marrese, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 658, 662 (1985) (footnote omitted).
149 Burbank, supra note 3, at 1188.
150 See, e.g., Burbank, The Costs of Complexity (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1471-76
(1987).
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administrability problems of a system of borrowed law are more interesting, but not for reasons that those tempted to make them might think.
It is not surprising that, with some notable exceptions, the trend of
modem procedural law has been away from rules that make policy
choices towards those that confer on trial courts a substantial amount of
normative discretion. 15 1 For once one has settled upon trans-substantive
rules as the best way of achieving uniformity, simplicity and predictability, and once one acknowledges the impact of procedure on the substantive law, concerns about either the legitimacy of the enterprise 52 or its
efficacy' 53 push in that direction. Moreover, in a system dominated, as
modem American procedure has been dominated, by equity, 154 the
avoidance of prospective policy choices holds the promise that justice
may be done,; with procedure its servant rather than master.' 55
Federal Rules that avoid policy choices and that in essence chart ad
hoc decision-making.by trial judges are uniform and hence trans-substantive in only the most trivial sense.1 5 6 More important, the banner of
simplicity and predictability under which they fly' 5 7 is by now false advertising. There is little that is simple or predictable about contemporary
federal procedure. Litigants and courts need more guidance than the
Federal Rules provide, and to find it they must turn to a bewildering
array of local rules, standing orders, and standard operating procedures,
to say nothing of case law.' 58 Too often they must turn to the judge
herself.' 59 The Federal Rules may largely eschew borrowing, 160 but they
are nonetheless heavily in debt. Ours is a system that would have appalled those who hoped for "speedier and more intelligent disposition
of
16
the issues ... and ... a reduction in the expense of litigation."' '
Attempts to discipline this chaos, such as the admirable project currently studying local court rules, 162 may not succeed in reducing the
multiplicity of sources of rules. They may simply drive the rules further
151 See id. at 1474. There is also a trend in favor of greater allocative discretion. See, e.g., FED. R.
Crv. P. 52.
152 See Burbank, supra note 150, at 1474-76; Subrin, supra note 137, at 960-61.
153 See Burbank, supra note 27, at 311, 324 (contrasting problems of foreseeability and risks of
inappropriate procedural choices posed for trans-substantive rules with those posed for rules to
implement a single substantive scheme).
154 See Subrin, supra note 137; Burbank, supra note 150, at 1469-70, 1478-80; Burbank, The Chancellor's Boot, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 31 (1988).
155 See Clark, The HandmaidofJustice, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 297 (1938); Subrin, supra note 137, at 961-

82.
156
157
158

Burbank, supra note 150, at 1473-74.
See supra text accompanying note 137.
The ninety-four federal district courts currently have an aggregate of 4,998 local rules,
not including thousands of "sub-rules," standing orders and standard operating procedures. These rules are extraordinarily diverse, and the numbers continue to grow rapidly.
To give one stark example, the Central District of California... has 31 local rules with 434
"sub-rules," supplemented by approximately 275 standing orders....
Coquillette, Introduction to The Special Invitational Conference on Local Court Rules 2 (Nov. 1213, 1987).
159 See Burbank, The Chancellor'sBoot, supra note 154, at 33.
160 See supra text accompanying note 147.
161 S. REP. No. 1174, supra note 137. See Burbank, supra note 66, at 425-27.
162 See, e.g., 1987 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JDl)ICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 79; supra note 158.
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from official view, and hence from the view of litigants and their lawyers.
Worse, they may drive judges further from rules. Interstate federal practice cannot be any easier today than it was when proponents of the Enabling Act championed the cause of one interstate lawyer as against that
of a hundred who stayed at home, 16 3 but the costs imposed by its complexity are surely more widely felt. 1' 4 In any event, intrastate federal
practice is itself complex and risky business, particularly in courts whose
invocation of sanctions 165 and other "procedural" roadblocks 16 6 signals
67
a reversal in the master-servant relationship.
If one admits that only a lawyer can think about procedure and substantive law as if they were discrete preserves, that modern federal procedure is complex and in large measure unpredictable, and that the Federal
Rules are in similar measure only superficially uniform and trans-substantive, alternative reform strategies appear in sharper focus. Two such
strategies have dominated recent efforts of the rulemakers and debate in
the literature. One is to enhance the power of trial judges to manage
litigation.16 8 Another is to enhance incentives for people to avoid litigation. 169 Both represent steps in the flight from law.
There is another way, one that takes seriously the interrelationship
of procedure and substantive law, that adopts a comparative view of simplicity and predictability, that does not equate uniformity with trans-substantivity, and that is animated by faith in a liberal view of law and hence
of rights.' 7 0 If we should have standing orders for RICO cases, 17 1 why
should we not have uniform rules that govern such cases, and those like
them, in the respects in which they are deemed atypical, either because of their
172
procedural requirements or the requirements of the substantive law?
163 Senator Thomas Walsh, the bete noir of Enabling Act proponents, declared himself "for the
one hundred who stay at home as against the one who goes abroad" as early as 1915. Simplification of
JudicialProcedure: HearingsPursuantto S. Res. 552 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary,
64th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1915). See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1063-64.
164 "There is a growing body of specialized federal law and a more mobile federal bar, accompanied by an increased demand for specialized legal services regardless of state boundaries." Frazier v.
Heebe, 107 S. Ct. 2607, 2612 n.7 (1987).
165 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 37; Burbank, supra note 150, at 1478.
166 See, e.g., DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 821 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 455 (1987) (federal civil rights and other claims precluded by unreviewed state administrative proceedings); Burbank, supra note 6, at 817-22.
167 See supra note 148 and accompanying text; infra note 170 and accompanying text.
168 Seee.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 16; Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HAtIRv. L. REV. 374 (1982); Burbank,
supra note 150, at 1476-83.
169 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 150, at 1483-87; Burbank, supra note 66, at 432 & n.40.
170 More generally, it is judges who have been closing the courthouse door, not Congress.
That they have been doing it under a system of equity rules may make the suggestion that
we consider putting more law in a merged system seem not "stingier," as Judge Weinstein
describes it, but more liberal, at least in the sense of valuing rights.
Burbank, The Chancellor's Boot, supra note 154, at 34 (footnotes omitted).
171 See, e.g., Patti v. Seiderl, No. 87-0223 (E.D. Pa. April 16, 1987) ("RICO Case Standing
Order").
172 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would continue to govern matters not deemed to require special rules. Cf Rules Enabling Act of 1985: Hearing on H.R. 2633 and H.R. 3550 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. ofJustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 9, 21 n.12 (1985) (statement of Stephen B. Burbank) (noting Congress' failure to advert to
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If civil rights cases really do require special pleading rules, 173 perhaps
they also require other special rules that accommodate their distinctive
attributes. If we should have an unofficial Manual For Complex Litigation, 174 why should we not think about a separate set of procedural175rules
for complex cases, as well as a system for identifying such cases?
Objections to such a strategy are predictable. Some will conjure up
the writ system and the forms of action, without mentioning, let alone
comparatively evaluating, the costs of the rival system that triumphed in
1938,176 or crediting us with the ability to avoid the sacrifice of substantive rights at the altar of procedural purity. 177 We need to see
whether it is possible to merge law and equity, adversariness and judicial control, without submerging one or the other. The enterprise will
reveal substantial-perhaps unacceptable-costs, but the relevant
comparison is not just the costs of the equity-based procedure initiated in 1938.... [F]ederal judges are moving further beyond equity,
returning to practices previously rejected, even at the
in some cases
178
trial stage.
Others, taking a page from Thomas Walsh, the chief antagonist of
the Enabling Act, will stress the enormity of the enterprise and the inevitable complexity of any product. 7 9 We are constantly reminded that
"judicial reform is no sport for the short-winded,"'18 0 but often the quip
more accurately describes the time it takes to sell a proposed reform than
the time invested in conceiving it.181 In any case, simplicity is a comparaI trust that my critics will not want to buy false
tive good, 8and
2
advertising.'
the "possible need for specialized procedure.., when it enacts legislation" and proposing "Proce-

dural Impact Statement"); Burbank, supra note 6, at 831-32 (same).
For other suggestions that we should consider departures from the norm of trans-substantive
procedure, e.g., Subrin, supra note 137, at 977, 985, 991, 995-96; Rosenberg, The Federal Rules After
HaLfa Century, 36 ME. L. REV. 243 (1984).
173 See, e.g., United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980). But see Marcus, The
Revival of Fact PleadingUnder the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986). See also

supra note 172.
174 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) (1985).
175 On the dangers of using complex litigation as a norm for trans-substantive rules, see Sherman, Restructuringthe Trial Processin the Age of Complex Litigation (Book Review), 63 TEx. L. REv. 721,
744-45 (1984); Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the FederalRules of
Civil Procedure, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 813 (1981). See also Burbank, supra note 150, at 1465, 1468.

176 See Burbank, supra note 150, at 1479.
177 One of the purposes of the bill that became the Enabling Act was to "make it more certain
that if a plaintiff has a cause of action he would not be turned out of court upon a technicality and
without a trial upon the very merits of the case." S.REP. No. 1174, supra note 137.
178 Burbank, supra note 150, at 1479. For a discussion of some of the costs of this approach by
one who is equally aware of the costs of the current system, see Hazard, Forms of Action Under the
FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 628 (1988).
179 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1088-89, 1111-12.
180 A. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION XiX (A. Vanderbilt ed.
1949).
181 What we know as the "Field Code" was prepared in an astonishingly short period of time. See
Reppy, The Field Codification Concept, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD: CENTENARY ESSAYS 33-34 (1949). The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were prepared in approximately two and one half years. See Chandler, Some Major Advances in the FederalJudicialSystem, 1922-1947, 31 F.R.D. 307, 491-98 (1963).

182 See supra text accompanying note 157.
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An objection to a strategy of reform of this sort not likely to be
stated, but very powerful, is the objection that it would require procedural reformers to become conversant with the substantive law, or at
least to work with those who are so conversant. It would thus have obvious and potentially far-reaching professional and political implications,
threatening myths of expertise 8 3 on the one hand and of legitimacy' 4
on the other. Effective procedural reform will not come from a small
group of "experts," nor will it come from the Supreme Court alone. We
need partnerships in determining how the field should be carved up for
study, in studying it, and in implementing proposed reforms. Existing
projects furnish possible models for the work,' 8 5 and we need to think
for Conabout other models. We also need to show more respect, if not
86
gress, then for democratic ideals that we elsewhere profess.'
West may be "such a little baby,"' 8 7 but it holds, at least for me,
lessons that transcend the limitations context. To some the case may
illustrate not the promise of formalism but its folly. Careful analysis
reveals, however, that the problem in West is not formalism but rather a
particular solution, itself problematic, generalized by reason of the transsubstantive scope of the Federal Rules. It is time to bring problems both
are, in fact, capaof scope and of values to the surface to see whether we
88
ble of generalizations, of rules, worthy of the name.
In his inaugural lecture at Oxford, Professor Atiyah concluded
with observations that well describe the dilemma of modern federal
procedure:
I have said that perhaps one reason for the trend I have described is
that it is easier to conceal a diversity of values when principles are jettisoned in favor of individualized justice. But how long can this process of concealment last? At a time when the ideal of egalitarianism
rides as high as it does today, it is supremely ironical that we should at
the same time be embracing discretion and rejecting principles; for
183 See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 137, at 968-69.
184 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 3, at 1068, 1194-97.
185 One existing project that could accommodate a study of the sort envisioned is the American
Law Institute's Project on Compensation and Liability for Product and Process Injuries. See AMERuCAN LAw INST., 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 15, 17.
An existing project that actually has as its goal the exploration of means to integrate substance
and process is underway at Northeastern University School of Law. The work involves collaboration
among Professors Judith Olans Brown and Phyllis Tropper Bauman, specialists in the field of employment discrimination, and Professor Stephen Subrin, a specialist in procedure.
186 See Burbank, The Chancellor's Boot, supra note 154, at 34. The proposal is decidedly not that
Congress assume primary responsibility for prospective procedural law. It may be useful, however,
to consider a two-track system for rules, involving "the submission to Congress of all provisions in
the area of procedure, broadly defined, that are thought to be needed, divided into two groups:
those subject to congressional review and those requiring congressional approval." Burbank, supra
note 3, at 1195 n.775. This is in fact the approach suggestd by Paul Carrington for the amendment
of Rule 4. See Carrington, supra note 87, at [Ed. Tan 51-55].
187 In a discussion about the original Advisory Committee's power to recommend Federal Rules
on matters of evidence, Professor Morgan observed: "I think, if you put that up to the Court, they
would say, as the servant girl said, 'It is such a little baby.' (Laughter)." 4 Proceedings of Meeting of
Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure of the Supreme Court of the United States 974
(Feb. 20-25, 1936) (available in Harvard Law School Library). See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1144
n.566.
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this process must of necessity encourage and legitimize a greater inequality of treatment in the judicial process. The diversity of values
underlying judicial decisions is thus concealed only by encouraging adeparture from the ideal of equality. 18 9
I assume that equality is a goal of procedural justice as it is of substantive
justice. I also assume that a redistribution of power may be necessary if
equality is to be achieved. Ultimately, the fate of effective procedural
reform may turn on the willingness of federal judges to share some of
their power so that procedure may once again be the servant of justice,
procedural and substantive.
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